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Yearning for Zion Ranch Raid 
LOWERING THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR THE 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In April 2008, over 400 children were seized from the 
Yearning for Zion Ranch in Eldorado, Texas by Child 
Protective Services on the grounds that the children were 
suffering from abuse.1 An anonymous complaint made by a 
sixteen-year-old girl alleging physical and sexual abuse 
prompted the raid.2 The residents of the Ranch were members 
of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints (“FLDS”), a breakaway sect of the mainstream Mormon 
community.3 The state sought to remove the children from their 
parents’ custody on the premise that the sect’s belief in 
polygamy and underage marriage created an imminent danger 
to the children’s physical health and safety.4 
This incident escalated the conflict between parental 
rights and religious rights.5 Currently, the state’s burden of 
proof to remove children from parental custody is the “clear 
and convincing” standard as outlined in the landmark Supreme 
  
 1 Hari Sreenivasan, Finding the Truth in Eldorado: Is the FLDS Raid About 
Stopping Child Abuse, or Is Freedom of Religion Being Abused?, CBS NEWS, Apr. 20, 
2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/20/sunday/main4029277.shtml. 
 2 Ralph Blumenthal, Additional Children Removed At Polygamist Ranch in 
Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at A27. 
 3 The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“FLDS”) 
is a splinter sect of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, the mainstream 
Mormon religion. Mormonism began in 1830 as a religion that believed in polygamy 
but such belief was abandoned by the Church of Mormon in 1890. Since then many 
splinter groups have been created such as FLDS. These splinter groups, including 
FLDS, continue to preach the validity of polygamy despite its illegal nature. 
Additionally, as with most fundamental religions, FLDS and other splinter groups 
maintain a rigorous lifestyle devoted to the doctrine of their religion. See D. Michael 
Quinn, Plural Marriage and Mormon Fundamentalism, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND 
SOCIETY 240, 252 (Martin E. Marty & Scott Appleby eds., 1993). 
 4 In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1 (Tex. App. May 
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 
613 (Tex. 2008). 
 5 See Sreenivasan, supra note 1. 
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Court case, Santosky v. Kramer.6 This heightened standard 
requires the evidence to be more persuasive than the common 
civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., more 
likely than not.7 Consequently, states like Texas have statutes 
that require proof of imminent danger to a child’s physical 
health or safety for even temporary removal of children from 
the custody of their parents.8 However, following the Yearning 
for Zion Ranch raid, the question remains whether the nature 
of these religious beliefs creates the type of imminent danger to 
physical health and safety required by statute.9  
Affirming the Court of Appeals of Texas, the Texas 
Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that the 
physical health or safety of the children from the Yearning for 
Zion Ranch were in danger.10 Nor did the court find that the 
FLDS belief system constituted sufficient evidence of imminent 
abuse to warrant removal of the children from their parents.11 
Furthermore, although it noted that the case involved 
“important fundamental issues concerning parental rights and 
the State’s interest in protecting children,” it declined to 
further elaborate on these issues.12 
  
 6 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982). 
 7 See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text. 
 8 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201 (Vernon 2008). The relevant Texas statute 
regarding removal pending a final termination hearing states in part: 
(b) At the conclusion of the full adversary hearing, the court shall order the 
return of the child to the parent . . . or custodian entitled to possession unless 
the court finds sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence 
and caution that: (1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of 
the child which was caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled to 
possession and for the child to remain in the home is contrary to the welfare 
of the child; 
. . . . 
(d) In determining whether there is a continuing danger to the physical 
health or safety of the child, the court may consider whether the household to 
which the child would be returned includes a person who: (1) has abused or 
neglected another child in a manner that caused serious injury to or the 
death of the other child; or (2) has sexually abused another child. 
Id.; see also In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1 (Tex. App. May 
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 
613 (Tex. 2008). 
 9 See In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1-3; Sreenivasan, supra note 1. 
 10 In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d. 613, 615 (Tex. 
2008). 
 11 See id. Although the Court affirmed the ruling, it did so on the condition 
that appropriate relief still be granted to protect the children, although the court did 
not specify what type of relief would be appropriate. Id. 
 12 Id. (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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The state intervention at the Yearning for Zion Ranch is 
not the first raid on a Mormon fundamentalist community. In 
1953, over 120 Arizona officers arrested thirty-six men and 
eighty-six women, and took into custody 263 children from a 
fundamentalist community in Short Creek, Arizona.13 The 
purpose of the raid14 was to protect the children from “‘the foulest 
conspiracy [one] could imagine . . . dedicated to the production of 
white slaves.’”15 However, similar to the Yearning for Zion Ranch 
case, the Supreme Court of Arizona ordered that the children be 
returned home to their families.16 The Arizona court held that 
the parents of the children seized in the Short Creek raid had 
been denied participation by their attorneys during the custody 
hearing, thereby resulting in a violation of the due process of law 
and rendering a decision to deprive the parents of custody of 
their children invalid.17 Furthermore, the Arizona court found 
that neither party had presented evidence as to whether the 
children’s safety and welfare would best be protected by 
depriving the parents the right to custody.18 As a result, the 
presumption that the child’s interests are best served by 
allowing custody to remain with the child’s parents was not 
rebutted, and therefore, it was in the interest of the children of 
Short Creek to remain with their parents.19  
Given the history of clashes between the state and 
Mormon fundamentalists, the Yearning for Zion Ranch case 
revived important issues dealing with a parent’s fundamental 
rights in conflict with the interests of the State. This Note 
argues that a parent’s religious beliefs can be evidence of 
physical abuse and thus a danger to a child’s safety, prompting 
the need for removal. Part I discusses a parent’s rights to the 
upbringing of his or her child under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as the current burden of proof required to 
terminate these parental rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Part I also examines a parent’s right to control 
the religious upbringing of his or her child and contends that 
these rights are not absolute and can be a factor in a custody 
  
 13 Michael Homer, Children in New Religious Movements: The Mormon 
Experience, in INTRODUCTION TO NEW AND ALTERNATIVE RELIGIONS IN AMERICA 224, 
234 (Eugene V. Gallagher & W. Michael Ashcroft eds., 2006). 
 14 As advocated by then-Governor of Arizona, J. Howard Pyle. Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Ariz. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 296. P.2d 298, 299-300 (Ariz. 1956). 
 18 Id. at 301. 
 19 Id. 
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determination. Next, Part II argues that religious beliefs 
normally protected under the First Amendment can be 
considered as evidence in parental termination cases and 
suggests that termination is appropriate where these religious 
beliefs are abusive. Furthermore, Part II contends that because 
the Yearning for Zion Ranch community resembles one large 
family and, in general, the presence of abuse in one child is 
sufficient for the removal of the other children in the family, 
the remainder of the Yearning for Zion Ranch children should 
also be removed. Part III examines the policy arguments in 
support of lowering the evidentiary standard. Part III asserts 
that the current evidentiary standard leaves the child’s 
interest to remain free from abuse not as protected as the 
parent’s interest in custody of his or her child. Therefore, 
further protection is warranted and can be achieved by 
lowering the standard of proof. Finally, Part IV concludes that 
when religion is considered abusive and pervasive throughout a 
close community, like the Yearning for Zion Ranch, then the 
standard of proof to remove the children from their parents in 
the community should be lowered from the clear and 
convincing standard to the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The current burden of proof for termination of parental 
rights should be lowered to a preponderance of the evidence 
standard in cases where a pervasive religious belief system 
throughout a community promotes abuse in at least some of the 
children within that community. In order to understand the 
rationale behind this argument, it is first necessary to 
understand the current law in regards to parental rights 
termination, as well as the role of religion in child custody cases. 
A. Termination of Child Custody Rights 
1. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights in 
Child Custody Proceedings 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution requires that no state “deprive any person of life, 
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liberty, or property, without due process of law.”20 Pursuant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, parents inherently have a 
fundamental right to the care and custody of their children 
unencumbered by the state.21 The right to marry, procreate, 
and raise one’s children is considered “one of the basic civil 
rights of man.”22 The Supreme Court first recognized the right 
of parents to rear their children in Meyer v. Nebraska,23 holding 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, 
and property also included the protection of the individual’s 
right to raise children.24 Specifically, the State could not 
interfere with a parent’s choice to teach her children a foreign 
language because this would be an undue interference with the 
parent’s right to raise her children.25 Similarly, in Prince v. 
Massachusetts, the Court recognized that a parent has the 
authority to raise his or her child as part of “the private realm 
of family life which the state cannot enter.”26 However, the 
Court recognized that this private right could not conflict with 
the state’s interest to protect the welfare of children.27 The 
court stated that the rights of parenthood are not beyond 
limitation and that the state may proscribe or compel certain 
activity that is in the best interest of the child’s welfare.28 
  
 20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The purpose of this provision is to provide 
individuals with substantive and procedural protections when individual’s 
fundamental rights are at risk of being compromised or terminated. See Ann E. Ward, 
Standards of Proof in Parental Rights Termination: Santosky v. Kramer, 36 SW. L.J. 
1069, 1070 (1982); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 523 (2d ed. 2002). Procedural due process refers to the procedures the 
government must undertake when seeking to deprive a person of their life, liberty, or 
property. Id. This process usually means that an individual is entitled to notice and a 
hearing before these rights are terminated. Id. Substantive due process refers to the 
reasoning behind the deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or property. Id. The 
level of substantive due process afforded depends upon the inherent nature of the 
fundamental right at stake. Id. at 524. Generally, for an interest that is deemed 
important to the individual, the government needs to show a compelling reason to 
deprive the individual of this interest. Id. Parental custody rights are interests that are 
deemed to be fundamental and, thus, required to be afforded both procedural and 
substantive due process. Id. 
 21 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 22 Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see 
also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 23 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 24 Id. at 399. 
 25 See generally Meyer, 262 U.S. 390. 
 26 Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66. 
 27 Id. at 165. 
 28 Id. at 166-68 (holding that the state may limit a parent’s insistence that a 
child hand out religious literature as part of child employment laws). 
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Given that parents have a fundamental right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the care and custody of their 
children, due process protections are necessary when the state 
seeks to limit or terminate this fundamental right.29 As such, 
the government may only terminate custody if the parents are 
afforded some minimal level of procedural protection through 
which they can argue their case.30 Furthermore, terminating 
the parent’s custody must be necessary to achieve the State’s 
compelling interest.31 
To determine whether due process was met, the 
following three factors, originally articulated in Matthews v. 
Eldridge, must be considered: 1) the private interest affected 
by government action; 2) the government’s countervailing 
interest including “fiscal and administrative burdens;” and 3) 
the risk of an erroneous decision.32 In a parental custody case, 
the private interest affected is the parent’s right to care for and 
have custody of his or her children.33 Additionally, unique to 
custody cases, the child has a private interest at stake, 
specifically the interest to be “free from abuse or neglect.”34 
However, the child’s interest is not given the same weight as 
the parent’s interest.35 The government’s interest is the health, 
safety, and welfare of the children involved.36 In this respect, 
the government’s interest is presumably aligned with the 
parent’s interest in that the state and the parents are generally 
concerned with preserving a child’s well-being, and this is 
usually best achieved when a child is cared for by his or her 
parents.37 However, the government’s interest will diverge from 
that of the parents when the government has decided that 
  
 29 See Ward, supra note 20, at 1070-71. 
 30 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 772. Although procedures will vary from 
state to state, courts will determine the sufficiency of the procedural protection by 
analyzing the process using the Eldridge factors. See infra note 32 and accompanying 
text. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 33 Parents have an interest in “the companionship, care, custody and 
management of his or her children” that “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a 
powerful countervailing interest, protection.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham 
County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
 34 Ward, supra note 20, at 1070. 
 35 Id. at 1072. 
 36 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. 
 37 See id. 
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remaining in the care and custody of the parent is no longer in 
the best interest of the child.38  
Additionally, the government must be concerned with 
the fiscal and administrative costs of conducting a hearing to 
determine the custody rights of parents.39 An increase in the 
number of hearings required to comport with due process 
standards undoubtedly increases the cost to the public.40 
However, conserving administrative resources and lowering 
costs are not controlling factors in determining whether 
procedural safeguards are met.41 In parental custody cases, the 
child’s welfare will outweigh these fiscal and administrative 
factors.42 Finally, the court must consider the possibility of an 
erroneous decision leading to a wrongful termination of the 
parent’s custodial rights, which would not be in the best 
interest of the parent, child, or the government. Thus, given 
the importance of the interests at stake, the Supreme Court 
has concluded that a hearing is necessary in order to decide 
whether or not termination of parental rights is appropriate.43 
2. Santosky v. Kramer: The Clear and Convincing 
Standard 
In conducting a hearing, an individual’s due process 
rights are protected by the standard of proof required to 
establish that the individual is no longer entitled to his or her 
liberty or property rights.44 There are three evidentiary 
standards: beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing, 
and preponderance of the evidence.45 The beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard, the highest level of proof, is applied to criminal 
cases in which an individual risks losing his freedom.46 The 
burden is on the prosecutor to convince a jury of a “subjective 
state of near certitude” that the defendant is guilty.47 This 
  
 38 See id.; Ward, supra note 20, at 1071-72. 
 39 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 348. 
 42 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972). 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1982); Spence v. Gormley, 
439 N.E.2d 741, 750 (Mass. 1982). 
 45 Ward, supra note 20, at 1075. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 331 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Norman Dorsen & Daniel A. Rezneck, In re 
Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 1, 26 (Dec. 1967)). 
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standard is applied because of the importance of the personal 
interest at stake and also the grave consequences of an 
erroneous decision (namely, an individual’s loss of freedom).48  
A preponderance of the evidence is the lowest standard 
and is applied in most civil cases where only monetary loss is 
at stake.49 By this standard, the weight of the evidence tends to 
support the facts of one party more so than the other party.50 
The clear and convincing standard of proof falls in between 
reasonable doubt and preponderance of evidence.51 This 
standard is applied when there is something at stake more 
important than just a pecuniary interest, but not as protected 
as an individual’s liberty.52 The clear and convincing standard 
is most often applicable when an individual’s fundamental 
rights are at stake.53 Generally, proof by clear and convincing 
evidence is defined as the persuasion of the trier of fact that 
“the facts asserted are highly probably true”54 and the trier of 
fact has a “clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of 
the facts related.”55 Specifically, the trier of fact must be 
persuaded by more than a “substantial margin”56 and with a 
“higher probability than is required by the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard.”57 
Prior to the decision in Santosky v. Kramer, states 
varied as to the standard of proof required for termination of 
parental custody. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court struck 
down a New York statute as unconstitutional on the grounds 
that it offended the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
  
 48 Ward, supra note 20, at 1075. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Annotation, Instructions Defining Term “Preponderance or Weight of the 
Evidence,” 93 A.L.R. 155 (1934). 
 51 Ward, supra note 20, at 1075. 
 52 Id. 
 53 In re Polk License Revocation, 449 A.2.2d 7, 13 (N.J. 1982). For example, in 
a civil commitment proceeding, the clear and convincing standard of proof is required 
since this type of proceeding involves the fundamental right of freedom from restraint. 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 84, 86 (1992). The clear and convincing standard 
may also be used in cases in which it is determined that a patient would wish to end 
life sustaining medical support. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 
285 (1990). Denaturalization and deportation proceedings also require a clear and 
convincing standard of proof. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966) 
(deportation); Chaunt v. U.S., 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (denaturalization). 
 54 Lopinto v. Haines, 441 A.2d 151, 156 (Conn. 1981). 
 55 First Nat’l Bank of Roland v. Rush, 785 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990). 
 56 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736 (1966). 
 57 California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 
93 n.6 (1981). 
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Amendment because it allowed for termination of custody 
rights upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the parent was unfit and the child was permanently 
neglected.58 The Court concluded that in order to terminate 
parental custody rights, the State must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the parents are no longer entitled to 
custody of their children.59 Thus, to terminate a parent’s 
custody rights,60 the trier of fact must have a “clear conviction, 
without hesitance, of the truth of the facts related”61 and believe 
that “the facts asserted are highly probably true.”62 In support 
of its decision, the Court applied the Eldridge factors in ruling 
out the preponderance standard in favor of the clear and 
convincing standard.63 First, the Court found that the private 
interests at stake were compelling.64 Second, the Court found 
that the risk of error in using the preponderance of the 
evidence standard was high because the parents would suffer 
an irrevocable grievous loss.65 Third, the Court concluded that 
any countervailing governmental interest in using a 
preponderance standard was minimal when compared to the 
first and second factors.66  
Since Santosky, all parental termination proceedings 
require the clear and convincing standard.67 The Court affirmed 
that, going forward, a case by case analysis for the evidentiary 
standard in termination proceedings was inappropriate and 
due process rules are applied to “the generality of the cases, not 
the rare exception.”68 It is crucial that the parties and the fact-
  
 58 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982). 
 59 Id. at 747-48. 
 60 A parent’s custody rights are generally terminated when there is evidence 
of abuse or neglect to the child. See generally SCOTT E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENT-
CHILD RELATIONSHIPS: A HANDBOOK 133-44 (1992). 
 61 First Nat’l Bank of Roland v. Rush, 785 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990). 
 62 Lopinto v. Haines, 441 A.2d 151, 156 (Conn. 1981). 
 63 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758, 769. 
 64 Id. at 758. The Court considered the private interests of the parents to the 
care and custody of their children to be “far more precious than any property right.” Id. 
at 758-59. Further, to terminate a parent’s right to custody of his or her child would not 
mean merely an infringement upon the parent’s constitutional fundamental rights but 
an obliteration of this right all together. See id. at 759. Thus, the court found the 
private interest of the parents to be so compelling that a higher degree of certainty as 
to the parent’s unfitness is necessary to terminate custody rights. See id. at 759, 769. 
 65 Id. at 758-59.  
 66 Id. at 758. 
 67 Id. at 769. 
 68 Id. at 757 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matthews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)). 
314 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1 
finder are aware of “how the risk of error will be allocated, 
[thus] the standard of proof necessarily must be calibrated in 
advance.”69 Accordingly, state courts have unmistakably 
adopted the clear and convincing standard for child 
termination proceedings.70 Texas is no exception: the Texas 
Appellate Court has consistently held that the termination of 
parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence.71 
The effect of the use of this heightened standard in 
termination proceedings can be seen in other child protection 
laws. For instance, in Texas, emergency removal of children 
from the home is allowed only if there is an immediate danger 
to the health or safety of the child caused by the act or omission 
of a person entitled to custodial possession of the child, and 
protection requires immediate removal.72 Once this evidence is 
satisfied, a court may conclude that the child is in continuing 
danger by remaining in the home, and a temporary order of 
removal is therefore appropriate.73 This temporary removal 
could lead to permanent removal of a child from the home.74 
Thus, the high standards for temporary removal are another 
safeguard for the parents in a termination proceeding. For 
example, the Yearning for Zion Ranch case merely concerned a 
temporary, as opposed to permanent, removal, and the Texas 
Supreme Court held that there was no evidentiary basis for 
  
 69 Id. 
 70 Kent K. v. Bobby M., 110 P.3d 1013, 1015-16 (Ariz. 2005) (“The statue thus 
clearly requires that the party seeking termination establish the grounds for 
termination by clear and convincing evidence.”); In re A.C.G., 894 A.2d 436, 439 (D.C. 
2006) (“Proofs made in a termination proceeding must satisfy the clear and convincing 
evidence standard . . . that lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence and 
evidence probative beyond a reasonable doubt.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting In re K.A., 484 A.2d 992, 995 (D.C. 1984))).  
 71 See Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (evidence supporting 
termination must be clear and convincing (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48)); In re 
S.R.L., 243 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Tex. App. 2007) (“Parental rights can be terminated 
involuntarily only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.”); Colbert v. Dep’t of 
Family and Protective Servs., 227 S.W.3d 799, 807 (Tex. App. 2006); Ybarra v. Tex. 
Dep’t of Human Servs., 869 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. App. 1993) (“Because the 
termination of the parent-child relationship severs rights treasured by the law, strict 
standards apply; evidence to meet those standards must be clear and convincing.”); 
Hellman v. Kincy, 632 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. App. 1982) (“[D]ue process requires that 
the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48)). 
 72 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b) (Vernon 2008); see also In re Tex. Dep’t 
of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 614 (Tex. 2008). 
 73 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(c); see also In re Tex. Dep’t. of Family and 
Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 614-15. 
 74 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206; TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(c). 
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temporary removal of the children from the Yearning for Zion 
Ranch.75 The court found the belief system of the members of 
the Ranch alone did not prove an immediate danger to the 
health and safety of the children.76 Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that this evidence would be sufficient to satisfy the 
clear and convincing standard in a permanent termination 
proceeding.  
B. The First Amendment: The Parent’s Rights to Control 
the Child’s Religious Upbringing 
As part of a parent’s fundamental right to the custody 
and control of his or her child, as established in Meyer v. 
Nebraska and Prince v. Massachusetts, a parent has the right 
to control the child’s religious upbringing.77 This right, 
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, is further protected 
by the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise 
clauses.78 The Court has interpreted these clauses to include 
the notion that parents are entitled to the protection of their 
religious beliefs in raising their children.79  
A pivotal case demonstrating the extent to which a 
parent has a right to control his or her child’s religious 
upbringing is Wisconsin v. Yoder. In this case, Amish parents 
refused to enroll their children in any public or private school 
after completing the eighth grade, thereby violating Wisconsin’s 
mandatory school-attendance law.80 As a result, the parents were 
convicted and fined for violating the state statute.81 The parents 
brought suit on the grounds that their First and Fourteenth 
  
 75 In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 615. 
 76 In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4 (Tex. App. May 
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 
613 (Tex. 2008). 
 77 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 778-79. 
 78 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). The 
First Amendment is divided into two clauses: the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause can be interpreted in a number of different 
ways. However, it is often interpreted to mean that the government cannot use religion 
as a ground for its action or inaction or favor one religion over another. CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 20, at 1193, 1196 (3d ed. 2006). The Free Exercise Clause provides that the 
government will not interfere with an individual’s right to believe nor the individual’s 
right to act in regards to religious beliefs. Id. at 1247. 
 79 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233; Jennifer Ann Drobac, For the Sake of the 
Children: Court Consideration of Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1609, 1614 (1998). 
 80 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. 
 81 Id. at 208. 
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Amendment rights were violated due to the fact that enrollment 
in high school violated the Amish belief system.82 The Supreme 
Court held that Wisconsin’s requirement of education after the 
eighth grade violated the Amish parents’ free exercise of their 
religious beliefs.83 In so deciding, the Court established that the 
free exercise of religion includes the right of parents to control 
the religious upbringing of their children84 and that the parent’s 
right to religious upbringing trumps the right of the state to 
require child education.85 
Nonetheless, the right of parents to control the religious 
upbringing of their children is not absolute.86 In Prince v. 
Massachusetts, an aunt, having custodianship over her niece, 
brought the young girl with her to distribute Jehovah’s Witness 
material, in violation of the state’s child labor laws.87 Although 
the Court recognized that children have the right to exercise 
their religious beliefs and that parents have the right to 
promote religious education for their children,88 the right to 
exercise religion is not beyond state limitation.89 The state may 
limit parental freedoms where the child’s welfare is affected, 
even if the freedoms include religious conviction.90 Exercising 
its police powers, the state has a right to limit child labor by 
  
 82 Id. at 208-09. The Amish religion supports the belief that in order to have 
salvation, members of the religion must live in a church community that is separate 
from the world. Id. at 210. The Amish believe in a simple life that is in contradiction 
with the typical contemporary ideals, which praise material success and individuality 
as opposed to community. Id. There is a pervasive belief in the Amish community that 
a child’s attendance in high school provides “impermissible exposure of their children 
to a ‘worldly’ influence in conflict with their beliefs.” Id. at 211. No objection is made by 
the Amish community to a child’s attendance of grades first through eighth because the 
community believes that the children need to be taught the basic skills in order to be 
good Amish citizens. Id. at 212. The parents in this case brought substantial expert 
testimony about the beliefs and lifestyle of the Amish community in order for the court 
to rule on the First Amendment claim. Id. at 209. 
 83 Id. at 219. 
 84 Drobac, supra note 79, at 1614. 
 85 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15, 221-22. 
 86 See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that 
exercising religious beliefs may not override child labor laws).  
 87 Id. at 160-61, 163. Under Massachusetts General Laws, it is illegal for any 
person to furnish a minor with articles knowing that the minor intends to sell these 
articles. Furthermore, it is illegal for a parent, guardian or custodian to encourage a 
child to work in violation of child labor laws, including allowing a child under the age of 
sixteen to work or to work long hours or work in the evening. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 149 §§ 80-81 (West 2004). 
 88 Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. 
 89 Id. at 166. 
 90 Id. at 167. 
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placing restrictions on when and where children may work, 
even if their work consists of furthering their religious beliefs.91 
Although Yoder and Prince appear to be diametrically 
opposed, it is possible to distinguish the propositions for which 
they stand and to create a rule regarding state intervention in 
parental religious rights. The determining factor underlying 
the different outcomes in each case is the nature of the law 
violated by the parents’ religious practice. For instance, in 
Prince, Sarah Prince’s First Amendment right to allow her 
niece to distribute religious pamphlets conflicted with the 
state’s child labor laws.92 In limiting Prince’s right to control 
her niece’s practice of religion, the Court held that child labor 
was “among evils . . . [whose] crippling effects” require state 
action to protect the “healthy, well-rounded growth” of 
children.93 However, in Yoder, the conflict arose from a state 
statute requiring mandatory school attendance for students 
from grades one through twelve.94 In finding in favor of the 
Amish parents, the Court decided that non-compliance with the 
mandatory school attendance statute was not a threat to the 
social welfare of the child.95 The Court was concerned that by 
forcing the Amish children to attend school, the state would 
undermine the Amish community’s religious beliefs by 
influencing and shaping the beliefs of their children through 
education.96 According to the Yoder Court, this was the “kind of 
objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First 
Amendment was designed to prevent.”97 
Indeed, the Yoder Court distinguished the facts of the 
case from the Prince decision. In refusing to afford weight to 
the State’s argument that exempting Amish children from the 
school attendance requirement deprived the children of their 
right to secondary education, the Court noted that this right is 
not comparable to the “evils” associated with child labor.98 
Accordingly, the rule suggested by these two cases is that 
unless the state can show a compelling interest in protecting 
  
 91 Id. at 168-69. 
 92 Id. at 159. 
 93 Id. at 168. 
 94 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 n.2 (1972). 
 95 Drobac, supra note 79, at 1615. 
 96 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 229-30. 
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the child’s welfare, such as preventing child labor, the parent’s 
First Amendment claim will prevail.99 
C. Considering Religion in Child Custody Cases 
In child custody proceedings, the state has a compelling 
interest to protect the welfare of the child involved;100 thus, 
parents generally do not have a valid First Amendment claim 
when the court considers the religion of the parents in custody 
proceedings. The Court in Prince qualified its decision by 
stating that its ruling did “not extend beyond the facts [of] the 
case” and did not give the states license to justify intervention 
in religious activities on behalf of children “in the name of 
health and welfare.”101 Nonetheless, since the Prince decision, 
courts have carefully examined the religious beliefs of parents 
in child custody cases.102 In divorce proceedings involving child 
custody disputes, the courts have looked to religion as one 
factor to determine the fitness of each parent to care for the 
child.103 The standard used by many courts is that a parent’s 
religious activity will not be a factor when it is clear that the 
child will not be harmed from the religious activity.104 As one 
court noted, “[s]o long as a court makes findings as to a child’s 
actual needs respecting religion, the court may consider such 
needs, as one factor, in awarding custody.”105 Thus, the courts 
are using a standard derived from Prince and Yoder—the 
child’s welfare must be at stake in order to deprive parents of 
  
 99 See Drobac, supra note 79, at 1615 (“The [Yoder] decision suggests that 
absent a showing that a parent’s actions will ‘jeopardize’ the child’s health or safety, a 
court may not regulate or restrict the religious behaviors of the parent.”). However, 
since the decision in Yoder, the Court has held that laws which are facially neutral 
with regard to religion will be considered valid. See id. at 1617. While this is the 
current state of the law regarding free exercise of religion, it is not of much use in child 
custody cases because these cases involve the parent’s fundamental right to the 
upbringing of their children and thus the heightened standard is still necessary. See id. 
 100 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 101 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944). 
 102 See George L. Blum, Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Child Custody 
Cases, 124 A.L.R. 5TH 203 (2004); see also Lauren C. Miele, Note, Big Love or Big 
Problem: Should Polygamous Relationships Be a Factor in Determining Child Custody, 
43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 105, 122-23 (2008) (discussing religious considerations in child 
custody proceedings). 
 103 Miele, supra note 102, at 122. 
 104 Id. at 123. 
 105 Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Alaska 1979) (citing Wojnarowicz 
v. Wojnarowicz, 137 A.2d 618, 621 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1958)). 
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their right to care and custody of their child on the grounds of 
their religious beliefs.106  
For example, in Colopy v. Colopy, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court considered the religious needs of children in a 
custody dispute.107 In this case, the father was awarded custody 
of the couple’s five children.108 Prior to the proceeding, the 
couple had lived at a religious center as part of a religious 
community.109 However, as a result of a change in the rules of 
the community, the couple was no longer allowed to live as 
husband and wife, and the children were separated from their 
parents and each other and forced to live with other adults in 
the community.110 When the mother refused to leave the 
religious center, the court found that it was in the best interest 
of the children to award custody to the father, who had left the 
community and established a home in mainstream society.111  
As evidenced in Colopy v. Colopy, in order for religion to 
be considered in a child custody hearing, it must pose an 
extreme threat to a child’s safety or welfare. Simply practicing 
a religion that promotes seemingly unorthodox beliefs is not 
enough to infringe upon a parent’s right to control the religious 
upbringing of his or her children. For instance, in Burnham v. 
Burnham, the Nebraska court considered the religious beliefs 
of the parents in determining custody of the child in a divorce 
proceeding.112 In this case, the mother of the child practiced 
Catholicism of the Tridentine Church of Fatima Crusaders.113 
Under this religion, the woman’s marriage to the child’s father 
was not legitimate because they were not married in the 
Fatima Crusader Church.114 Consequently, the mother believed 
the child to be illegitimate.115 She also believed that she was 
  
 106 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 107 Colopy v. Colopy, 203 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Mass. 1964). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Burnham v. Burnham, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Neb. 1981). “The courts 
preserve an attitude of impartiality between religions and will not disqualify a parent 
because of his or her religious beliefs.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Goodman v. Goodman, 141 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Neb. 1966)). “However, we do have a duty 
to consider whether such beliefs threaten the health or well-being of the child.” Id. 
 113 Id. at 60. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. It is worth noting that the parents were actually married in the 
Catholic Church before the birth of their child; however, because it is not the Fatima 
Crusaders Church, it was not seen in the eyes of the mother as legitimate. Id. 
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“bound . . . [by] mortal sin to educate her child in the . . . 
Church.”116 The school connected with the Tridentine Church 
allowed for corporal punishment and strict discipline and 
required a parental waiver releasing the school of all liability 
in case of an unforeseen accident.117 The mother stated that it 
was her intention to send the child to this school because 
failure to do so would result in her excommunication from the 
Church.118 Additionally, the mother’s brother was ostracized 
from the family by the mother and her own parents for his 
failure to convert from Catholicism to the Church of 
Tridentine.119 She testified that if her daughter was to decide 
that she did not want to be a part of the Church of Tridentine, 
she would be willing to cut the child from her life.120  
Based on these facts, the court held that it was 
obligated to consider the religious beliefs of the mother in 
determining who should be awarded custody.121 In considering 
the mother’s religious beliefs, the court decided that these 
beliefs could possibly have an adverse impact on the 
upbringing of the child.122 Namely, the belief that the child was 
illegitimate and the fact that the mother would be willing to 
cut the child out of her life caused the court to conclude that 
the father should be awarded custody of the child.123  
The above-mentioned cases are not the exception to the 
norm,124 many state courts find that religion can be a 
determining factor in child custody suits.125 Thus, based on the 
  
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 61. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 61-62.  
 124 Although these cases are not the exception to the norm, some courts still 
refuse to look at religion as a factor in determining the custody placement of a child. 
See Alaniz v. Alaniz, 867 S.W.2d 54, 56-57 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that awarding 
custody on the premise that one parent’s religion is more normal than the other 
parent’s is not proper); In re Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 285 (Tex. App. 
1987) (holding that the test for determining the custody of a child is the “‘best interest 
of the child’” test and not the religious beliefs of the mother without evidential proof 
that these beliefs were illegal or caused harm to the child (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 14.07(a) (Vernon 1986))); Blum, supra note 102.  
 125 See Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1235-36 (Mass. 1997) (holding 
that when the children had been brought up in the Jewish faith, it was proper for the 
court to limit their exposure to the father’s Christian beliefs as a matter of custody 
provisions); Graci v. Graci, 187 A.D.2d 970, 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that the 
mother’s religious education of the children contributed to her home being a superior 
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above examples, courts have the ability to consider religion in 
child custody cases without infringing upon the First 
Amendment rights of the parents.126 If the courts can apply 
religion as a factor in determining the outcome for child custody 
disputes without violating the First Amendment, then by logical 
extension, the courts can apply religion to parental termination 
proceedings without violating the First Amendment. 
II. SUPPORT FOR TERMINATION UNDER THE CURRENT LAW 
Where there is a pervasive religious belief throughout a 
community condoning child abuse,127 the burden of proof should 
be lowered from the clear and convincing standard to a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. However, even under 
the current evidentiary standard there is support for the 
removal of children who have not been abused but where 
abusive religious beliefs are present in a communal living 
arrangement. 
A. Applying Religion to Termination Proceedings 
Considering religion in parental termination proceedings is 
a necessary step towards lowering the standard of proof for 
termination of parental custody rights in cases where a pervasive 
belief system in a community condones child abuse. However, the 
application of religion as a factor in child custody proceedings has 
been confined mostly to individual child custody disputes, usually 
arising out of divorce.128 The religious beliefs of a child’s parents are 
generally not a factor in parental termination proceedings because 
for termination to occur, the state must prove that “the child is 
subjected to real physical or emotional harm and less drastic 
measures would be unavailing.”129 Typically, grounds for 
  
environment for the children); Aldous v. Aldous, 99 A.D.2d 197, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1984) (holding that religion was one factor among many in determining the custody of 
the child). See generally Blum, supra note 102. Other courts have also utilized religion 
as a factor in custody determination hearings.  
 126 See generally Blum, supra note 102. 
 127 See discussion infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.  
 128 See supra Part I.C.  
 129 Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Although religion is 
generally not the main factor in parental termination proceedings, in some cases, 
religion is a motivating factor. See In re State ex rel. Black, 283 P.2d 887, 913 (Utah 
1955). However, these types of cases historically involved other strong factors 
warranting removal. For instance, in In re State ex rel. Black, the Blacks’ religion 
dictated that the family engage in illegal polygamous behavior. Id. at 903. 
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termination result from “severe or chronic abuse or neglect.”130 For 
example, sexual abuse including anything from fondling to sexual 
intercourse is considered a crime and gives the state grounds to 
intervene “under its parens patriae authority.”131 Additionally, 
emotional abuse resulting in diminished psychological functioning 
or failure to thrive or control aggressive behavior also may result in 
state protection of the child.132 Thus, more often than not, physical 
or emotional abuse is the focus of a termination proceeding rather 
than the ideological beliefs of the parents involved. 
However, religion often plays an indirect role in 
termination proceedings when it is the source of abuse or 
neglect. For example, in In re Edward C, the California Court 
of Appeals considered evidence that the children had been 
physically abused because they were being hit with a strap and 
“lectured about God at mealtimes for so long that they often fell 
asleep without eating.”133 In defending his actions, the father 
explained that “he loved and treated his children equally and 
that God directed his discipline of them.”134 Thus, while the 
court did not specifically base its termination decision on the 
religious beliefs of the father, it was the effect of those beliefs 
that led to the permanent termination of his rights. In response 
to the parents’ claim that their religious freedoms prevented 
the court from infringing upon the upbringing of their children, 
the court stated that “mistreatment of a child . . . is not 
privileged because it is imposed in the guise of freedom of 
religious expression.”135 Therefore, while on its face religion is 
not generally considered in parental termination proceedings, 
its effect on the treatment of children will be a factor in 
determining whether a parent should maintain his or her 
custodial rights.  
  
 130 LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE 
LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 
841 (2002). 
 131 FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 136. Parens patriae is the doctrine invoked by 
courts that treats the state as a parent to a child by asserting jurisdiction over the 
child. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205-07, 210 (1980), reprinted in HARRIS & 
TEITELBAUM, supra note 130, at 322 n.1, 323 (2002). 
 132 FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 138. 
 133 Id. at 134; see also In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. 694, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
 134 In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 698; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, 
at 134. 
 135 In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 699; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, 
at 135. 
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Another case considering religion in custodial 
termination proceedings arose out of the Short Creek raid.136 
The court ruled that the removal of children from the care of 
their parents was appropriate in In re State in Interest of 
Black.137 This case involved a family living on the Utah side of 
Short Creek, rather than the Arizona side, and subject to the 
Utah courts’ jurisdiction.138 In this case, Leonard Black and 
Vera Johnson were deprived of the custody and control of their 
children resulting from an unlawful polygamous marriage.139 
The court held that exposing the children to “[t]he practice of 
polygamy, unlawful cohabitation and adultery”140 constituted 
child neglect because the parents failed to offer “the proper 
maintenance, care, training and education contemplated and 
required by law and morals.”141 Effectively, the court found that 
the parents created an environment that was not conducive to 
the proper upbringing of children through their unlawful 
practice of polygamy.142 As such, the court conclusively 
determined that religious beliefs and practices will not be 
afforded constitutional protection when they are in conflict 
with the laws of the nation and result in detriment to the 
child’s welfare. 
Applying the foregoing facts to the Yearning for Zion 
case, the religious beliefs of the residents of the Ranch would 
likely not be considered as a prima facie factor for termination. 
However, the effects of the beliefs held by members of the 
Ranch are certainly relevant to a termination proceeding.143 
Specifically, a group of pubescent, underage girls at the Ranch 
were spiritually married.144 This “effect” of the religion is a clear 
  
 136 See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. 
 137 In re State ex rel. Black, 283 P.2d 887, 913 (Utah 1955). 
 138 Whereas most of the custody hearings for children taken from their 
parents in Short Creek were held under Arizona’s jurisdiction and ultimately led to 
custody being placed with the parents as a result of due process violations, this case 
was tried separately in the Utah state courts and thus avoided constitutional 
infringements. Id. at 888. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 913. 
 141 Id. at 895. 
 142 As a result of the court’s findings, Vera Johnson was deprived of her right 
to custody of her children and only upon a showing that she was no longer living with 
Leonard Black would she be granted temporary custody of the children. Id. at 913. 
 143 Miele, supra note 102, at 132-34 (discussing the impact of polygamy and 
the belief system surrounding the practice in child custody hearings). 
 144 Spiritually married refers to the fact that girls and women on the Ranch 
were not legally married to their “husbands.” Rather they were spiritually married 
typically in a polygamous household. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 
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violation of Texas law prohibiting sexual conduct with a minor 
and constitutes traditional sexual abuse, which is a ground for 
parental termination.145 In fact, the court acknowledged that 
sexual abuse was established as to these girls on the basis of 
the evidence of their pregnancies and involvement in underage 
sexual intercourse as condoned by the belief system of the 
Yearning for Zion Ranch community.146 
However, as to the other female children (not among the 
group identified as having been sexually abused), the court 
specifically found there to be no abuse or threat to the physical 
health or safety of these children.147 The court held that, absent 
any evidence of a danger to the physical health or safety of the 
children, the belief system of the Ranch was not enough to 
warrant interference by the state.148 Similarly, the court decided 
that there was no threat to boys on the Ranch because there 
were no signs of any physical or sexual abuse.149 Thus, the court 
decided that the religious beliefs of the residents on the 
Yearning for Zion Ranch did not constitute strong enough 
evidence to warrant removal of the children that had not been 
physically abused.150 
Justice O’Neill, joined by Justices Willet and Johnson, 
concurred with the court’s ruling that the Texas Department of 
Family and Protective Services failed to provide evidence of an 
imminent danger to the children’s health and safety as it 
related to boys and pre-pubescent females.151 However, Justice 
O’Neill disagreed with the majority’s holding that there was no 
  
255 S.W.3d 613, 616 n.1 (Tex. 2008) (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 145 See id. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 136-38. 
 146 In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 
613 (Tex. 2008). As to the five female children alleged to have suffered sexual abuse, 
they were not among the children the court considered in the petition for mandamus 
and the court as much as conceded that these five females were sexually abused, 
stating “[w]ith the exception of the five female children identified as having become 
pregnant between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, there was no evidence of any 
physical abuse or harm to any other child.” Id. at *2. 
 147 Id. at *3. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 The five female children who showed signs of sexual abuse were not 
included in the court’s decision. These female children were not the children of the 
parents petitioning for a writ of mandamus. Id. 
 151 In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. 
2008) (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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evidence that pubescent girls were in danger.152 Justice O’Neill 
pointed to the high number of girls on the Ranch under 
eighteen years old who were pregnant, had given birth, or were 
“spiritually married.”153 She also noted that under the 
standards of the Ranch, girls were never too young to be 
married or to have children and that the religious leader of the 
sect had the power to decide when and to whom a girl would be 
married.154 Further evidence was offered that under the Texas 
Penal Code, child abuse occurs when a person engages in 
sexual conduct with a child under the age of seventeen who is 
not the legal spouse of that individual.155 Given this definition, 
the girls from the Yearning for Zion Ranch fit under the 
definition of sexual abuse because they were not legally 
married to their “husbands,” but rather were only spiritually 
married.156 Based on this evidence of a “pattern or practice of 
sexual abuse,” Justice O’Neill concluded that all the pubescent 
girls at the Ranch were in danger of sexual abuse and 
therefore, removal from the Ranch and their parents was 
appropriate.157  
Contrary to the majority’s opinion, Justice O’Neill found 
that the religious beliefs did “present[] evidence that ‘there was 
a danger to the physical health or safety’ of pubescent girls on 
the [Ranch].”158 Because the Ranch community believed in 
polygamy, spiritual marriage, and impregnating girls under 
  
 152 Justice O’Neill found that the evidence of abuse in some of the pubescent 
females created a “pattern or practice of sexual abuse, that ‘the urgent need for 
protection required the immediate removal’ of those girls.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 262.201(b)(1)-(3)). 
 153 In re Texas Department of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616 
(O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 154 Id. Justice O’Neill was persuaded by testimony from a child psychologist 
that these practices constitute child abuse because children who are fifteen and sixteen 
years old are “not sufficiently emotionally mature to enter a healthy consensual sexual 
relationship or a ‘marriage.’” Id. The child psychologist also testified that the belief 
system on the Ranch was such that all of the children exposed to these beliefs were in 
danger, regardless of their age or gender. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND 
PROTECTIVE SERVICES, ELDORADO INVESTIGATION 7 (2008) [hereinafter ELDORADO 
INVESTIGATION]. 
 155 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)-(b) (Vernon 2003).  
 156 In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616 
(O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 157 Id. at 616-17. Supporting her holding, Justice O’Neill cited Texas 
Department of Human Services v. Boyd, where the court held that endangering a child 
meant “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-
than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the 
child or that the child actually suffers injury.” Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. 
v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)).  
 158 Id. at 616. 
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the age of eighteen, Justice O’Neill found that there was 
enough evidence to establish “a pattern or practice of sexual 
abuse” and “that other such girls were at risk of sexual abuse 
as well.”159 Similarly, the Texas Department of Family and 
Protective Services made an ultimate finding that twelve girls, 
or one out of every four, on the Ranch, were victims of sexual 
abuse and that their parents were aware of this abuse.160 As a 
result, the Department found that these twelve girls, along 
with 262 other children on the Ranch, were victims of neglect 
because their parents failed to remove them from situations 
where they would be exposed to sexual abuse.161 Accordingly, 
Justice O’Neill’s opinion and the Department of Family and 
Protective Services’ findings suggests that religious beliefs 
serve as a factor in establishing a pattern of sexual abuse that 
can extend beyond just the abused children to other children at 
risk of the same behavior.162 Therefore, in considering the 
religious convictions of the FLDS members at the Yearning for 
Zion Ranch, it is possible to conclude that their religious beliefs 
condone statutory rape resulting from the adherence to 
“spiritually marrying” underage girls. Given this conclusion, 
removal of these children was warranted because the Ranch 
provided an unsafe atmosphere and created a risk of harm to 
all the children on the Ranch. 
B. Analogizing the Yearning for Zion Ranch to a Family 
The children at the Yearning for Zion Ranch were 
properly removed from their parents by the Department of 
Family and Protective Services due to the fact that the 
community as a whole condoned sexual abuse among some of 
the children. The Texas Supreme Court should have 
characterized the Ranch as a family in order to justify removal 
of the remaining children who were not abused but are at risk 
for future abuse. Conversely, the Texas Supreme Court 
determined that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant 
removal of most of the children from the Yearning for Zion 
Ranch because there was no apparent physical abuse as to 
these children individually.163 However, the court failed to 
  
 159 Id. at 616-17.  
 160 ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 154, at 4. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 163 See generally In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613. 
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consider the idea that individualized proof is not necessary.164 
Courts and legislatures have authorized the removal of 
children from parental care in cases where there was only 
evidence that one sibling had been abused.165 Similarly, the 
Texas Supreme Court should have characterized the Ranch as 
a family in order to justify removal of the remaining children 
who were not abused but are at risk for future abuse. 
Cases where parents lose custody of all their children 
based on evidence of abuse in only one child are justified by 
reasoning that if there is evidence of neglect or abuse in one 
child, then it is likely that the other children are also victims of 
abuse or neglect.166 One study showed that in almost half of the 
families where abuse was present, more than one child was 
abused.167 This same study also demonstrated that the 
likelihood of the abuse reoccurring was high.168 Other similar 
  
 164 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(i) (Consol. 1999) (“[P]roof of the 
abuse or neglect of one child shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse or 
neglect of any other child of, or the legal responsibility of, the respondent . . . .”). 
 165 In Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals held that removal of one child 
based on neglect of a sibling was appropriate. In re William B., 533 A.2d. 16, 21 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (“The parents’ ability to care for the needs of one child is probative 
of their ability to care for other children in the family.”). In support of its holding, the 
court stated that authorities should not have to wait until a child suffers abuse or 
neglect to determine that the parents are unfit. See id. Although such a finding must 
be adduced by actual evidence, “the fear of harm” may be enough to remove a child 
from parental custody. Id. Similarly, a New York court held that “proof of the abuse or 
neglect of one child is admissible evidence on the issue of abuse or neglect of a sibling 
and in appropriate cases it can be sufficient alone to sustain a finding of abuse or 
neglect.” In re Kimberly H., 242 A.D.2d 35, 36, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (where an 
infant was taken from her mother on derivative grounds due to the fact that the 
mother had already had her three other children taken from her recently as a result of 
her beating one of the children with a belt). The court further explained that when a 
prior finding of abuse is close enough in time to the current proceeding, the condition of 
abuse is presumed to still exist. Id. at 36. In Texas, the relevant statute states: 
In determining whether there is a continuing danger to the physical health or 
safety of the child, the court may consider whether the household to which 
the child would be returned includes a person who: (1) has abused or 
neglected another child in a manner that caused serious injury to or the 
death of the other child; or (2) has sexually abused another child. 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(d)(1)-(2) (Vernon 2008). 
 166 See generally DONALD T. KRAMER, 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 16:38 
(2008); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse: Evaluating the Danger Posed by a 
Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim’s Siblings, 51 EMORY L.J. 241, 244, 255 (2002) 
(discussing social science studies tending to show abuse in one child leads to a 
presumption of abuse in the child’s siblings). 
 167 In over forty-five percent of the families studied, more than one child in the 
family suffered abuse. Roy C. Herrenkohl et al., The Repetition of Child Abuse: How 
Frequently Does It Occur?, 3 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 72 (1979). 
 168 Id. (incidents of abuse were reported in 18.5% of the 206 families studied 
whose cases had been closed, while reoccurrence, the repetition of abuse, was an even 
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studies demonstrate that where one child is abused, there is an 
increased likelihood that other children in the household are 
also being abused.169 Yet another study found that one-third to 
one-half of cases involving sexual abuse involved abuse of 
another relative as well.170 Despite these alarming figures, they 
may actually underestimate the true number of children 
suffering from abuse because often abuse goes unreported.171 
These studies further substantiate the idea that where one 
child in a family is abused, another child is probably also at 
risk because abuse towards the sibling could have gone 
unreported. Based on these studies it is possible to conclude 
that where there is abuse in one child, there is a presumption 
of abuse in the other children. Furthermore, even if that child 
has not also been abused or neglected, a home where family 
violence is present is not a safe atmosphere for the child.172 
Thus, courts often are willing to terminate parental custody in 
cases where there is no evidence of abuse towards one child but 
there is clear and convincing evidence of abuse towards the 
child’s sibling.173 The issue in these cases becomes not whether 
the child has been abused, but whether the child is likely to be 
abused and, therefore, the court has discretion to protect the 
children in an abusive household.174 Based on the 
characteristics and practices of the members at the Ranch, it is 
possible to analogize the Yearning for Zion Ranch community 
  
more serious problem); see also Edward D. Farber et al., The Sexual Abuse of Children: 
A Comparison of Male and Female Victims, 13 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 294, 296 
(1984) (“Forty-three percent (43%) of the children in this study reported having been 
molested on two or more occasions.”); Wilson, supra note 166, at 255-58. 
 169 For a discussion on studies showing incest and sexual abuse see Wilson, 
supra note 166, at 256-58. 
 170 DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA 242 (1986). A further study 
found that in one-fourth of cases involving abuse towards a child, the sibling was also 
abused. See Wilson, supra note 166, at 257. 
 171 RUSSELL, supra note 170; Farber et al., supra note 168, at 294; see also 
Wilson, supra note 166, at 256. 
 172 See supra note 165. 
 173 In re Baby Boy Santos, 336 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972) 
(holding that there was sufficient evidence to terminate the parental custody rights for 
a baby boy given the significant amount of abuse his sister had suffered even though he 
had not personally suffered abuse); see also In re Interest of M.B., 480 N.W.2d 160, 
161-62 (Neb. 1992) (“If evidence of the fault or habits of a parent or custodian indicates 
a risk of harm to a child, the juvenile court may properly take jurisdiction of that child, 
even though the child has not yet been harmed or abused.”).  
 174 In re Baby Boy Santos, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 819-20 (“It has been the experience 
of the Court, as well as authorities in the subject of child abuse, that there is in effect a 
‘child abuse syndrome’ and that when one abused child is removed from the home, that 
another child in the home may become the object of abuse by the parent.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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to a family.175 In doing so, there is support for removal of all the 
children despite a lack of physical abuse in each child.176  
The Texas Department of Family and Protective 
Services did argue that the Yearning for Zion Ranch 
constituted the equivalent of a household for the purposes of a 
custody proceeding. However, the Texas Appellate Court 
rejected this argument and the Texas Supreme Court 
affirmed.177 The Appellate Court stated that the notion that the 
Ranch comprised one household was contrary to the evidence, 
which showed that there were separate living arrangements 
and separate family groups.178 Contrary to the court’s opinion, 
the living arrangements at the Ranch indicate otherwise. 
Notably, the members of the Yearning for Zion Ranch do 
not all live in a single unit; they live in a guarded, concrete 
compound within which there are several housing units.179 
Although this is not a traditional single dwelling unit, it is similar 
to one in that the aggregate of the individual housing units within 
the locked compound equal one large estate.180 Furthermore, the 
fact that the Ranch does not allow outsiders into the compound 
makes it similar to the family dwelling that restricts outsiders 
unless they have been invited to enter the dwelling.181 
The court also incorrectly pointed to the existence of 
separate family groups to reject the notion that the Ranch 
constitutes a family. Adherents to the FLDS religion encourage 
the practice of polygamy, allowing a male to take several wives 
and have multiple children with each wife.182 As such, it is 
difficult to distinguish separate family groups amongst the mix 
of husbands with several wives and children. In fact, because it 
was facially unclear which child belonged to which parents, the 
residents of the Ranch were compelled to participate in DNA 
  
 175 See infra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.  
 176 See supra notes 165-173 and accompanying text. 
 177 In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 (Tex. App. May 
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 
613 (Tex. 2008).  
 178 Id. at *3 n.10. 
 179 See id. at *3; Gretel C. Kovach & Andrew Murr, Trouble in the Hills, 
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2008, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/131379/page/1; 
Simon Romero, Wary Texans Keep Their Eyes on the Compound of a Polygamous Sect, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004. 
 180 See Romero, supra note 179, at 1. 
 181 See Kovach & Murr, supra note 179. 
 182 David Von Drehle, The Texas Polygamist Sect: Uncoupled and 
Unchartered, TIME, Apr. 24, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,1734818-2,00.html. 
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testing to determine the correct lineage of the children.183 The 
practice of polygamy and the refusal of the Ranch members to 
procreate with “outsiders” has created in-breeding184 and an 
undeniable biological link between many of the Yearning for 
Zion residents.  
Moreover, there are other factors that weigh in favor of 
the Yearning for Zion Ranch community being treated as a 
family. The traditional notion of family includes a husband and 
wife, legally married and living together with their children.185 
However, a family can also consist of unrelated individuals 
residing together.186 Some of the key factors that courts consider 
in establishing a family relationship are whether there is 
“stability, permanency and [a] functional lifestyle which is 
equivalent to that of the traditional family unit.”187 For 
instance, a group of college students living together were 
considered a family because they had renewable leases and an 
intention to remain in the living unit through the completion of 
their degrees.188 They also “ate together, shared household 
chores, and paid expenses from a common fund.”189 In contrast, 
a group-home was not considered a family because the staff 
worked for the home on a rotating basis, which caused a lack of 
stability.190 Also, the residents lived at the home for only a short 
period of time, thereby creating a lack of permanency.191 
  
 183 Kirk Johnson, DNA Is Taken From Sect’s Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 
2008, at A19. 
 184 See Sara Corbett, Children of God, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at MM1; 
Johnson, supra note 183. 
 185 See Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the 
Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 506 (1998). For 
discussion of the contemporary divergence from the traditional conception of the family 
see generally JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE (1997) and Chris Snow, Book Note, Defining the 
Family: The Family in Transition, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 287 (1999). 
 186 Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 21-22 
(Me. 1981); Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888, 894 (N.J. 1990). 
 187 Borough of Glassboro, 568 A.2d at 894. 
 188 Id.  
 189 Id. Although in a similar case, a group of college students were not 
considered a single family because they were not related by blood, adoption or 
marriage. However, this case involved an ordinance, which the Supreme Court upheld 
as not violating any constitutional right that specifically required that the individuals 
be related by blood, adoption or marriage. See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 
2-3, 9 (1974). In the present case, there is no ordinance in question that limits the 
definition of families to relation by blood, adoption or marriage. 
 190 Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp., 434 A.2d at 21-22. 
 191 Id. 
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Applying these factors here, the Yearning for Zion 
Ranch resembles a family due to the unique characteristics of 
the Ranch members’ lifestyle. The Ranch community exudes 
“stability, permanency and [a] functional lifestyle which is 
equivalent to that of the traditional family unit.”192 Similar to 
the college students deemed to satisfy the definition of a family 
because of their functioning as a family-type unit, the residents 
of the Ranch also function as a family-type unit.193 In particular, 
the Ranch has communal facilities such as a garden where 
residents can grow fruit and vegetables to share, a milk barn, a 
cheese factory, and other establishments meant for sustaining 
the community.194 The maintenance and use of these 
establishments in a communal fashion for the benefit of 
everyone at the Ranch is comparable to the college students 
sharing chores for the maintenance and benefit of the entire 
house in a familial manner.195 Additionally, unlike the group 
home where the rotation of staff members undermined 
stability, the Yearning for Zion Ranch has religious leaders 
that act as patriarchal figures.196 Therefore, the Yearning for 
Zion Ranch is more similar to a family than a shared home. 
Even if it is accepted that the Ranch constitutes a 
family, the issue of whether or not the belief system on the 
Ranch creates a dangerous atmosphere for the children is still 
debated.197 Similar to a family, the residents of the Ranch share 
  
 192 Borough of Glassboro, 568 A.2d at 894. 
 193 See id. 
 194 From Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch, CBS NEWS, Apr. 18, 2008, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/18/national/main4028781.shtml [hereinafter 
Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch] (detailing the initial establishment of the 
Yearning for Zion Ranch by members of FLDS); Stephanie Sinclair, Inside Their World, 
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 27, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
slideshow/2008/07/27/magazine/0727-ZION_index.html. 
 195 See Borough of Glassboro, 568 A.2d at 894. Similar to the college students 
who shared food and the responsibility of cooking and cleaning, members of the 
Yearning for Zion Ranch also share the source of their food and the expense and labor 
associated with their food source. See Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch, supra note 
194; Sinclair, supra note 194. 
 196 See Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp, 434 A.2d at 21-22. The Yearning 
for Zion Ranch is led by male religious leaders who dictate which men will marry which 
women, what type of contact the members will have with modern products and the way 
of life within the sect in general. See Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch, supra note 
194; Kirk Johnson & Gretel C. Kovach, Daughter of Sect Leader Gets Additional 
Protection, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, at A16; Kovach & Murr, supra note 179. 
 197 See, e.g., In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 
616-17 (Tex. 2008) (O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re Steed, 
No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 n.10 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008), aff’d sub 
nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. 2008); 
ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 154, at 6. 
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religious beliefs and require specific rules in the upbringing of 
children and the way of life in the Ranch.198 The Texas 
Department of Family and Protective Services argued that the 
existence of a “pervasive belief system” that condones young 
girls “marry[ing], engag[ing] in sex, and bear[ing] children as 
soon as they reach puberty” posed a threat of abuse to all the 
children on the Ranch.199 In response, the Texas court held that 
it was the beliefs and actions of certain individuals, and not the 
community as a whole, that posed a danger to the children.200 
However, as demonstrated in Yoder, courts will look at the 
beliefs of the entire religious community as precedent for 
determining how certain convictions will impact the 
community.201 Thus, a court examining this case should find 
that where members of a community, acting in a manner so as 
to resemble a family, promulgate a belief that in practice 
violates criminal statutes and constitutes sexual abuse of 
children and other members fail to stop this abuse or report it 
to authorities, the community has accepted this practice as a 
whole. This behavior creates an unsafe atmosphere for all the 
children exposed to it. 
In summary, the case of the Yearning for Zion Ranch 
can be analogized to a family for the purpose of removal in that 
it is a closed community that resembles a household. Thus, if 
some of the children on the Ranch are being abused and 
therefore qualify for removal, the court should be able to 
remove the other children because the possibility exists that 
these children are or will be abused and the atmosphere is not 
promoting the child’s welfare. However, because the Texas 
court applied the requisite clear and convincing evidence 
standard, the parents’ rights were not terminated and the 
children were returned to an unsafe environment. 
  
 198 See Kovach & Murr, supra note 179. 
 199 In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 200 Id. at *3. The Texas Appellate Court found that there was disagreement 
amongst members of the Yearning for Zion Ranch on what is an appropriate age for 
marriage. Id. at *3 n.9. 
 201 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209-12, 215, 219 (1972) (examining 
the effect of compulsory school attendance past the age of sixteen on the upbringing of 
children in the faith of the Old Order Amish religion). 
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III. LOWERING THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD 
Currently, the standard for termination of parental 
rights is the clear and convincing standard.202 However, in a 
situation where a pervasive belief system in a closed 
community, such as the Yearning for Zion Ranch, promotes 
child abuse in some of the children, the standard of proof for 
removal of the remainder of the children should be lowered. 
Although the current state of the law does not promote this 
assertion,203 the law should be revised in consideration of 
important policy perspectives. 
Requiring that the state prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the parent has either abused or neglected his or 
her children or caused them some other irreparable harm 
satisfies the Eldridge factors as to the parent.204 However, this 
standard does not necessarily provide adequate protection for 
the children involved.205 In granting parents greater protection 
by requiring the state to prove abuse by clear and convincing 
evidence, a potentially abused or neglected child is afforded 
less protection. In some circumstances, this could mean that an 
abused or neglected child is also being afforded less protection 
because the evidence of abuse or neglect may not be apparent. 
For instance, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services, a young boy was treated several times for 
injuries caused by his father, prompting a physician to report 
the injuries to the Department of Social Services.206 However, 
based on the requirement that the state show clear and 
convincing proof of abuse, the Department decided that there 
was not sufficient evidence of abuse to require that the boy be 
removed from the parent’s custody.207 Subsequently, the boy 
suffered from continual abuse that led to permanent brain 
damage and severe retardation.208 The rationale behind the 
Department’s decision and the clear and convincing standard 
in general is that just like it is better to let a guilty man go free 
than to send an innocent man to prison in the criminal 
  
 202 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 203 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982). 
 204 See supra text accompanying note 33. 
 205 See Catherine J. Ross, Legal Constraints on Child-Saving: The Strange 
Case of the Fundamentalist Latter-Day Saints at Yearning for Zion Ranch, 37 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 361, 372-73 (2008). 
 206 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192-93 (1989). 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 193. 
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context,209 here too it is better to allow a child to stay with 
parents who are abusive rather than to take a child away from 
non-abusive parents. However, the situations are distinct 
because in the criminal context the victim will likely never be 
harmed again by a wrongly acquitted defendant whereas a 
child is forced to continue living with his or her abusive parents 
when the state fails to prove abuse or neglect by clear and 
convincing evidence. Accordingly, the rationale in support of 
protecting a parent’s fundamental rights and liberty interests 
is upheld while the consequences to the child victim are not 
even considered.  
Returning to DeShaney v. Winnebago, the young boy’s 
mother brought suit against the Department of Social Services 
asserting a violation of the boy’s due process rights because the 
state failed to intervene on the boy’s behalf to protect him from 
his father’s abuse.210 The Court ruled against the child and held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is meant 
to protect individuals from state interference with their liberty 
or property rights, as opposed to private interference from 
private actors.211 Therefore, when the state’s interest and the 
parent’s interest diverge, in that the parent is no longer looking 
out for the health, safety, and welfare of the child, the child has 
virtually no due process protection of his or her own interest in 
being free from abuse.212 The Fourteenth Amendment protects 
the parent’s interest against undue interference by the state, 
while the clear and convincing standard places a heavy burden 
on the state to interfere even when abuse may be present.  
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent in Santosky, 
also found that the clear and convincing standard does not 
adequately protect the child’s interest in remaining free from 
abuse.213 While the majority opinion, in applying the Eldridge 
factors, merely considered the private interests of the parent, 
Justice Rehnquist also considered the private interest of the 
child involved.214 Specifically, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that 
the child has an interest independent from the parent in the 
  
 209 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 210 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193. 
 211 Id. at 196-97. 
 212 Cf. id. at 202-03 (holding that the State was not required to protect a child 
from abuse at the hands of his father). 
 213 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 788-90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 214 Id. at 788-90. 
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outcome of a termination proceeding.215 While both the child 
and the parent have an interest in avoiding an erroneous 
termination, severing the ties between the parent and child, 
the child also has an interest in avoiding an erroneous 
continuation of a relationship where abuse is present.216 Thus, 
since the interests of the parent and the child are of equal 
importance, the appropriate conclusion, according to Justice 
Rehnquist, is to apportion the risk of an erroneous termination 
equally and therefore the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is the correct standard.217  
Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that children are 
not afforded the same protection as adults in termination 
proceedings. While it is undeniable that parents have a 
fundamental right to the upbringing of their children, and that 
the state has a compelling interest in avoiding wrongful 
termination of parental custodial rights,218 children have an 
equally compelling interest in remaining free from abuse. 
However, as DeShaney demonstrates, children have no due 
process protection to be free from abuse.219 Thus, while parents 
have the Fourteenth Amendment right to the control of their 
children and the added protection of the clear and convincing 
standard in termination proceedings, children have virtually no 
protection.220 As such, the clear and convincing standard may 
not always be the right standard to apply in termination 
proceedings. In order to best protect a child’s interest to be free 
from abuse, it is prudent to lower the standard of proof from 
clear and convincing to a preponderance of the evidence in 
some circumstances, such as cases involving extreme and 
potentially dangerous religious communities. 
In the case of the children from the Yearning for Zion 
Ranch, the children remain at risk of abuse due to the 
“pervasive belief system” of the community,221 as evidenced by 
the presence of pregnant and “married” underage females on 
  
 215 Id. at 788 n.13. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 791; see generally Raymond C. O’Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due 
Process Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209 (1994) (arguing that 
the clear and convincing standard is too onerous a burden and does not adequately 
protect the interests of the children involved). 
 218 See supra text accompanying notes 33-36. 
 219 See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text. 
 220 See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text. 
 221 In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. May 
22, 2008), aff’d sub nom. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 
613 (Tex. 2008). 
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the Ranch.222 Although the Texas Supreme Court held that 
there was not enough evidence of an imminent threat to the 
children’s health or welfare,223 given this risk of future abuse, 
the children on the Ranch should be removed. Yet, in order to 
establish abuse warranting removal, the standard of proof 
must be lowered. If it can be established by clear and 
convincing evidence that some of the children in a family-like 
community were abused, then the standard by which the state 
needs to show that the other children are threatened by abuse 
should be lowered to a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Therefore, since there was enough evidence of abuse to satisfy 
the clear and convincing standard for five pregnant and 
married underage girls on the Ranch,224 then it should be 
possible to prove abuse as to the other children by a 
preponderance of the evidence.225 
While it is true that the boys living on the Ranch are not 
subject to the same possibility of abuse as the girls, they should 
nevertheless be considered in danger.226 Regardless of gender, if 
one child is abused in the home by the parents then the other 
children are deemed to be at risk and the parents are 
considered unfit.227 Because there is abuse against some of the 
girls at the Ranch, which can be analogized to a family,228 the 
boys should be removed from the Ranch as well. A study in the 
Netherlands concluded that there are actually few differences 
between sexual abuse towards girls and boys and in as many as 
21% of the cases studied, offenders were equally interested in 
males and females.229 Additionally, parental termination 
  
 222 See In re Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d at 616 
(O’Neill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 223 Id. at 615 (majority opinion). 
 224 See In re Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (noting that there was no evidence 
as to abuse in the children except as to the five female children).  
 225 By lowering the standard to a preponderance of the evidence for the 
remaining children not showing signs of abuse, the state will be able to prove the need 
for termination by demonstrating conclusive abuse in some of the children on the 
Ranch and the presence of pervasive belief condoning abuse. This is based on the 
presumption that where abuse is present in some children, it is likely to be present or 
at least pose a risk to other children in the same environment. See supra Part II.B. 
 226 Courts have been willing to find a risk of potential abuse where one child 
has been abused regardless of the gender of the child’s siblings. See, e.g., In re 
Burchfield, 555 N.E.2d 325, 333 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (removing both the brother and 
sister of a female child who had suffered sexual abuse based on the unfitness of the 
environment). 
 227 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 228 See supra Part II.B. 
 229 Farber et al., supra note 168, at 295. 
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statutes, such as the Texas Family Code, do not differentiate 
by gender when authorizing removal of one child because of 
evidence of sexual abuse to the child’s sibling.230 In fact, the 
California Appellate Court has specifically dealt with the issue 
of abuse towards a female child as being sufficient evidence for 
removal of her brothers.231 The court held that “[b]rothers can 
be harmed by the knowledge that a parent has so abused the 
trust of their sister”232 and “aberrant sexual behavior by a 
parent places the victim’s siblings who remain in the home at 
risk of aberrant sexual behavior.”233 Furthermore, boys exposed 
to a sister’s abuse are being taught to become predators. 
Although there was no evidence that the boys on the Ranch 
were subject to sexual abuse, there is still a strong argument to 
be made that they are residing in a dangerous atmosphere. 
Therefore, a preponderance of evidence of abuse could be 
demonstrated to effectuate removal.  
IV. POTENTIAL ISSUES ARISING FROM LOWERING THE 
STANDARD OF PROOF 
Analogizing the Yearning for Zion Ranch to a family to 
provide a legal basis for lowering the standard of proof required 
to terminate parental rights is not without potential criticisms. 
Although these criticisms are valid, they do not create 
impermeable barriers to lowering the standard of proof under 
specific circumstances.  
A. Unequal Application of Due Process Principles 
The first potential issue arises from the premise of the 
argument: that in some cases the standard of proof required to 
  
 230 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(d)(1)-(2) (2008). The statute specifically 
states: “In determining whether there is a continuing danger to the physical health or 
safety of the child, the court may consider whether the household to which the child 
would be returned includes a person who: . . . has sexually abused another child.” 
§ 262.201(d)(2) (2005). Similarly, in New York, “proof of abuse or neglect of one child 
shall be admissible evidence of the abuse or neglect of any other child.” N.Y. FAM. CT. 
ACT § 1046 (1999). California’s statute provides that a child may be deemed a 
dependent of the court if “[t]he child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial 
risk that the child will be sexually abused . . . by his or her parent” or if “[t]he child’s 
sibling has been abused or neglected” in a manner defined by this section. CAL. WELF. 
& INT. CODE § 300(d), (j) (West 2008). 
 231 In re P.A., 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 448, 452-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).  
 232 Id. at 453 (citing In re Rubisela E., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 760, 775 (Cal.Ct. App. 
2000)). 
 233 Id. at 454. 
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terminate parental rights should be lowered. This creates an 
inequality in the application of parental termination law, where 
parents who are not part of a religious family espousing beliefs 
in child abuse are afforded a higher burden of proof than their 
counterparts who are part of such religious groups. Thus, certain 
persons are arguably provided greater due process than others. 
While on its face this criticism may ring true, the reality 
is that parents will still be afforded substantial due process 
even in situations where the standard of proof should be 
lowered. Due process requires procedural and substantive 
safeguards to protect parents from an erroneous termination 
decision.234 By lowering the burden of proof, there is no change 
substantively because the government still needs to prove a 
compelling interest in order to terminate the parent’s rights.235 
Procedurally, parents will be afforded protections because they 
will still be allowed a hearing before the termination of their 
rights and further, it will be necessary to first prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that at least one child is suffering 
from child abuse as a result of a pervasive belief system within 
the religious family. Thus, the burden of proof will be lowered 
only after the state had produced clear and convincing evidence 
of some abuse. Consequently, the lower standard of proof will 
only apply to other children after the higher standard has 
already been met.  
Furthermore, applying the preponderance of the 
evidence standard to parental termination proceedings will still 
comport with the Eldridge factors. In fact, each of the Eldridge 
factors will probably be applied more equitably.236 First, the 
private interest affected by lowering the burden of proof in 
certain cases considers both the child and the parent as distinct 
interests. Whereas currently the parent’s interest also include 
the child’s interest because it is assumed that their interests 
align,237 by lowering the burden of proof, the child is given a 
distinct interest from the parent to be free from abuse. This 
distinction of interests is apposite because the child’s interest 
was presumed aligned with the parent’s interest up until the 
point in time where clear and convincing evidence of abuse was 
shown as to another child. Once this threshold has been 
passed, it should then be assumed that the child’s interest 
  
 234 See supra Part IA.1. 
 235 See supra Part IA.1. 
 236 See supra notes 32-43. 
 237 Ross, supra note 205, at 366-67. 
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diverges from the parent’s. Second, the government’s interest is 
enhanced in the sense that its interest in ensuring the health, 
safety, and welfare of the children involved will be given 
greater consideration.238 By seriously considering the threat of 
abuse in a community where a pervasive belief system 
condoning abuse exists, the government’s interest in the 
children’s welfare is given greater weight than if the sole 
standard is the clear and convincing standard. Further, 
lowering the standard of proof in certain cases will also 
inherently lessen fiscal and administrative burdens in that it 
will not be necessary to exhaust resources attempting to collect 
elusive physical evidence for children who are in danger as a 
result of a belief condoning abuse and evidence of abuse in 
other children besides themselves.239  
Finally, the risk of an erroneous decision resulting in a 
parent’s rights being terminated unjustly is no more than 
where a parent’s rights are terminated as to one child when 
there is no abuse as to that child but there is clear and 
convincing evidence of abuse committed against another child 
in the same family.240 If terminating a parent’s rights to all of 
his or her children as a result of abuse of one child complies 
with due process,241 then applying the same principles to the 
Ranch, being treated as a family, should likewise comply with 
due process. Consequently, even if the standard of proof is 
lowered in some specific cases, the parents involved in these 
cases will still be afforded an appropriate level of due process.  
Even if it is conceded that some parents will be afforded 
a different level of due process than other parents, equality in 
due process is not necessary and not always possible. This 
should not be viewed as lowering the standard of proof because, 
as noted by the Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, “due 
process ‘is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’”242 The Court went 
on to hold that the “fundamental fairness” required by due 
process may vary based on the circumstances and thus a case-
  
 238 See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
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 242 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
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by-case analysis is appropriate.243 Dissenting from the majority 
in the Santosky opinion, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that “‘not 
all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the 
same kind of procedure.’”244 In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist 
stated that the flexibility of the due process concept required 
that its mandates be considered based upon the facts of each 
particular case.245 Thus, considering due process requirements 
on a case-by-case basis means that it is not necessary in every 
case to afford the same standard of proof afforded in a previous 
case of the same nature because the underlying facts will 
inherently require a different analysis.  
Accordingly, while it is possible to argue that lowering 
the standard for termination of parental rights will afford 
unequal constitutional process to some people based upon 
certain criteria, this is not fatal to this Note’s argument. First, 
a different standard of due process does not necessarily mean 
that the parents are not being afforded the appropriate level of 
due process. Second, the concept of due process is not 
completely clear or concrete, and thus, it is essential to provide 
for different procedural safeguards based upon the specific 
facts of the case. Therefore, regardless of whether the state is 
required to prove by only clear and convincing evidence or clear 
and convincing and by a preponderance of the evidence, a 
parent’s constitutional rights to due process will be protected.  
B. Problems with Treating the Ranch as a Family 
A second criticism arising from lowering the standard of 
proof in certain parental rights termination proceedings 
evolves from the idea that the Yearning for Zion Ranch is 
treated as a single family. First, treating the Ranch as a family 
would be contrary to the concept that each parent must be 
suspected of abuse before a child can be removed.246 Second, 
defining the Ranch as a family would create a slippery slope to 
  
 243 Id. at 24-26. 
 244 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774-75 (1982) (Rehnquist, J. 
dissenting) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
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 246 Ross, supra note 205, at 399. 
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allow other communities to be considered a family for the 
purpose of parental termination. While both of these 
arguments raise legitimate concerns, ultimately they should 
not defeat the objective that the burden of proof for parental 
termination proceedings must be lowered in some instances.  
The first counterargument to treating the Ranch as a 
family unit arises from the concept that each parent needs to 
be accused individually of abuse. The Texas courts specifically 
rejected the argument by the Department that the Ranch 
should be treated as one family unit.247 The Texas Court of 
Appeals noted that among the FLDS communities there were 
differences in opinions as to “what is an appropriate age to 
[marry], how many spouses to have, and when to start having 
children.”248 The court went on to state that “not all FLDS 
families are polygamous or allow their female children to 
marry as minors.”249 Supporting the view that the community’s 
beliefs cannot be treated as one whole, Catherine Ross in her 
article, Legal Constraints on Child-Saving: The Strange Case of 
the Fundamentalist Latter-Day Saints at Yearning for Zion 
Ranch, argues that the Fourth Amendment requires that 
“individualized suspicion of each parent [is necessary] before 
his or her child is removed.”250  
While these arguments against treating the Ranch as a 
family are somewhat compelling, they are not sufficient to 
preclude lowering the burden of proof. In analyzing the 
Department’s argument regarding treating the Ranch as a 
family, the Texas Court of Appeals simply stated that the 
notion that the Ranch constituted a family was contrary to the 
evidence, not that such a concept was an unreasonable 
possibility.251 Ostensibly, if sufficient evidence is presented, the 
Ranch or a similar community could be considered a family. 
Further, Professor Ross admits that requiring child welfare 
workers to “weigh the risk of abuse to each child in the 
household before removing the child” is a break from current 
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practice.252 Therefore, because the current laws of most states 
allow the government to remove children that it suspects are at 
a risk of abuse based on evidence of abuse to siblings, requiring 
individualized proof that each child is at risk from each parent 
is too stringent of a standard. 
Even if individualized proof is too stringent of a 
standard, critics may still argue that analogizing the Ranch to 
a family creates precedent that all religious communities or 
communities organized in a manner espousing a particular 
belief can also be analogized to a family. This parallel to a 
family should not be read so broadly. The Ranch can be 
analogized to a family because of the extreme measures it has 
taken to seclude itself from the rest of society and the lifestyle 
the members of the Ranch lead, including polygamy (creating 
confusion as to who comprises each nuclear family) and an 
integrated system of working and living together.253 Thus, 
asserting that the Ranch constitutes a legal family for the 
purpose of a parental termination proceeding is much different 
from a religious community that may share a belief system, 
attend religious services together, share meals together, etc., 
but are still members of the rest of society because they live 
and work and integrate with people outside of their 
community. Therefore, while it is possible that other 
communities could be seen as families for the sake of parental 
termination proceedings if the Ranch is considered a family, 
such a determination should be limited to situations where the 
community truly resembles a family as defined by cases such 
as Penobscot Area Housing Development Corp. and Borough of 
Glassboro.254 
V. CONCLUSION 
Parents have a constitutional right to the custody and 
control of their children, which encompasses the control over the 
religious upbringing of their children.255 Because this right is 
deemed to be fundamental, clear and convincing evidence of abuse 
and neglect must be demonstrated when the state seeks to 
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terminate these parental rights.256 However, while this standard 
adequately protects the rights of the parents, it fails to adequately 
protect the rights of the children to be free from abuse or neglect. 
In parental termination cases in a closed community where 
there is a pervasive belief system condoning sexual abuse of 
children, similar to that of the Yearning for Zion Ranch, the best 
procedure is to require clear and convincing evidence that abuse 
has occurred in some of the children as a result of this belief 
system. However, since this type of community resembles a family, 
it should be treated as a legal family. Thus, abuse found in one 
child in the community should be enough to remove the other 
children. In order to protect the interest of the children to be free 
from abuse, while still protecting the constitutional rights of 
parents to the custody of their children, the standard of proof 
required to remove the children who have not been abused should 
be the preponderance of the evidence standard. Therefore, to 
satisfy the burden of proof for parental termination, the state needs 
only prove that the children who have not been abused more likely 
than not will be abused because of the clear and convincing 
evidence of the actual abuse of other children in the compound. 
By lowering the standard of proof required for termination 
of parental custody rights, the court will be protecting the rights of 
children to live free from the abuse of their parents. Although the 
First Amendment right of free exercise of religion and the 
Fourteenth Amendment parental due process right require 
preservation, their importance should not overshadow the need for 
the state to protect the welfare of children.257 
Brittany Nilson† 
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